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NOTES AND COMMENTS
nebulous condition-such as the world was in until the Supreme Com-
mander said, "Let there be light, and there was light."
It is herewith submitted that the General Assembly of North Caro-
lina has, with any reasonable interpretation of the effect of G. S. 1-97(6),
provided the requisite "light."
JoE H. BARRINGTO-N, JR.
Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Waiver of Right
to Counsel in State Courts
In a recent case, Carter v. People of State of Illinois,1 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that failure by a state court to appoint
counsel for accused who pleaded guilty to murder did not constitute a
denial of due process where the record showed that accused, with his
rights fully explained to him, did not request that court appoint counsel,
and the record contained no evidence which would indicate that the de-
fendant was incapable of intelligently waiving his right to counsel.
The petitioner, Roy Carter, Negro, had pleaded guilty without the
aid of counsel when arraigned on an indictment for murder in 1928. He
received a ninety-nine-year sentence and in 1945 he brought a petition
for his release on writ of error in the Supreme Court of Illinois claim-
ing that the conviction on which his confinement was based was vitiated
by the denial of his right to the assistance of counsel under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Petitioner did not allege that he had requested
counsel be appointed or that he was ignorant of his right to counsel.
Carter was, in fact, represented by counsel on the day of sentence,
appointed by the court without his request.2 At the time of the relevant
events in 1928 Carter was thirty years of age and although he could read
and write, he had no formal education. He was of average mentality,
quiet and industrious, had worked as a cook and mechanic for the eleven
years preceding and had never before run afoul of the law. Although
these facts do not appear in the common law record, they do appear in
a transcript of testimony in connection with a hearing on mitigation of
the offense which was attached to the record. The Illinois Supreme
Courts affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and dismissed the writ
stating that the right to be represented by counsel is one which the
defendant may claim or waive as he shall determine, as no duty rests
upon the court to provide legal assistance for an accused unless he states
' Carter v. People of State of Illinois, - U. S. - , 67 Supp. Ct. 216, 91
L. ed. 157 (Adv. Ops.) (1946). For cases on the general subject "Right to
Counsel" see Note (1940) 84 L. ed. 383.
2 Id. at - , 67 Sup., Ct. at 219, 91 L. ed. at 160. Canizio v. People of State
of New York, 327 U. S. 82 (1946). Appointment of counsel on day of sentence
cured earlier defect of denial of right to counsel; a noncapital offense."People v. Carter, 391 Ill. 594, 63 N. E. (2d) 763 (1945).
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under oath his inability to procure counsel and expresses a desire to
have the court appoint one for him,4 and as there was no bill of excep-
tions in the record and it did not appear that the defendant sought to
have an attorney appointed, assignment .of error on the question could
not be §ustained.5
The Supreme Court of the United States in affirming the judgment
of the Illinois court restricted its view to the record before the state
court on writ of error, i.e., the common law record which included in-
dictment, judgment on plea of guilty, minute entry bearing on sentence
and the sentence. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion for the
majority stated that the Illinois court followed local practice in restrict-
ing its review to the common law record, that such practice constitutes
allowable state appellate procedure 6 and that there was no showing of a
denial of due process on that record, but intimated that petitioner should
bring a proper action in the state court in order to place the pertinent
facts, referred to above, before the court. Only after exhausting avail-
able state remedies can the petitioner come into a federal court.7  Deci-
sion on whether or not the whole case including the above-mentioned
facts would show a denial of due process was consequently reserved until
such facts were properly before the court.
In a dissent by Justice Douglas in which Justices Black and Rutledge
concur, it is agreed that there is no showing of a denial of the right of
counsel on the common law record, but doubt is expressed as to the true
basis for the state decision and it is concluded that the least that can
be done is to remand the decision to the state court so that any state
'ILL. CoNST. Art. II, §9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, .. ." ILL. REVISED STAT.
1943, c. 38, §730: "Every person charged with crime shall be allowed counsel, and
when he shall state upon oath that he is unable to procure counsel, the court shall
assign him competent counsel, who shall conduct his defense."
People v. Stubblefield, 391 Ill. 609, 63 N. E. (2d) 762 (1945); People v.
Stack, 391 Ill. 15, 62 N. E. (2d) 807 (1945) ; People v. Braner, 389 Ill. 190, 58
N. E. (2d) 869 (1945).
'Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 340 (1915): "... Repeated decisions of
this court have put it beyond the range of further debate that the 'due process'
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not the effect of imposing upon the States
any particular form or mode of procedure, . . ." Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S.
172, 175 (1899) : "The State has full control over the procedure of its courts,
both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such pro-
cedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution." McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S.
684 (1893) : "It is therefore clear that the right of appeal may be accorded by the
State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may seem proper."
'Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944), holding a state should deny all rem-
edies to a person whom it holds in prison in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, the federal courts would be available to provide a remedy to correct
such wrong. Kantok v. Clark, 68 F. Supp. 595 (D. N. H. 1946) held an appli-
cation for habeas corpus by one detained under state court judgment of conviction
will be entertained by a federal court only when it affirmatively appears that appli-
cant has exhausted his remedies in the state courts and there is no adequate
remedy available under the state law.
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procedural question may be untangled from the question arising under
the Federal Constitution.8 Justice Douglas further states, however, that
if the evidence contained in the transcript was properly before the court
then there would be a showing of a denial of due process.
Justice Murphy, in a separate dissent, contends that even on the com-
mon law record there is a clear showing of a denial of due process as
there is no affirmative evidence that petitioner understood the necessary
consequences of his plea, or that, fully appreciating all of his legal rights,
he intelligently waived his right to counsel.
In the Scottsboro case,9 Justice Southerland, writing the opinion for
the majority, made the often repeated statement, ". . . in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable ad-
equately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of
due process of law."' 0 This language has created much doubt as to
just what requirements the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment places upon the state courts in a capital case." Where the accused
pleads guilty to a crime in a state court there is a duty upon the court
to inform him of the meaning and consequences of such a plea, and the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is a duty upon
the state court to inform the defendant of his right to counsel.12  The
question then arises, is there a duty upon the court to appoint counsel
after explaining to the accused the meaning of the plea of guilty and his
right to counsel? If requested, the duty of appointment is clear.' 3  It
is where the accused in a capital case fails to make a request that the
difficulty arises. Does his failure to speak constitute a waiver? The
Supreme Court of the United States has never defined the scope of
waiver in a capital case in a state court but has in several cases held
certain circumstances not to constitute a waiver.'
4
The court in the instant case did not undertake to define waiver, but
8 Cf. State Tax Commissioners of Utah v. Van Colt, 306 U. S. 511 (1939).9 PowelU-v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
20 Id. at 71.
" Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 458 (1942). Certiorari granted because of
conflicting decisions on the question of an accused's right to counsel.
"2Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) ; Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 486
(1945).
" Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945). Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.
455 (1942). Counsel not appointed at accused's request; noncapital offense and
held not to constitute a denial of due process.
14 De Meerleer v. People of State of Michigan, - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct.
596, 91 L. ed. 471 (Adv. Ops.) (1947). Petitioner not advised of the consequences
of plea of guilty or of his right to counsel; Woods v. Niersthumer, - U. S. -,
66 Sup. Ct. 996, 90 L. ed. 931 (Adv. Ops.) (1946) (coercion in plea of guilty) ;
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945) (petitioner not permitted to consult with
attorney in period between arraignment and the impaneling of the jury) ; Rice v.
Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (plea of guilty is not a waiver of right of counsel;
1947]
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its decision did result in declaring a waiver in the circumstances of this
case by holding that when the accused has been made aware of his right
to counsel and then fails to request that the court appoint counsel to
assist him with his defense, such failure constitutes a waiver and there
is a presumption that such waiver was competently and intelligently
made. It is clear then, that the defendant, on a subsequent attack on the
judgment contending that he was denied due process by the failure of
the court to appoint counsel for him, must place sufficient evidence be-
fore the court to overcome the presumption that the waiver was intelli-
gently and competently made. This holding seems to be in accord with
the general proposition that the burden of proof is upon him who claims
injury. Justice Murphy, however, at least in capital cases, would start
with the assumption that any trial in a state court, where the accused
was tried and convicted without the aid of counsel, raises a presumption
of a lack of due process and places the burden upon the state of over-
coming this presumption and showing that the defendant did intelligently
and competently waive his right to counsel. This view, most certainly,
appeals to one's sense of justice and fairness but it is contrary to the
above-mentioned proposition that the burden of proof is with him who
claims injury, and from a practical point of view would place a tre-
mendous burden upon the state.
Since no test has been laid down by the Supreme Court as to what
constitutes an intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel
in a state court proceeding, it would seem pertinent to examine the fed-
eral cases on this point. In the case of Erwin v. Sanford,'5 the peti-
tioner on writ of habeas corpus alleged that he had been denied his
constitutional right of assistance of counsel. The court dismissed the
writ stating that the evidence showed that the petitioner freely and
voluntarily entered a plea of guilty of the offense charged in the indict-
ment, that no request for counsel was made by him. and that the entry of
his plea of guilty, since freely and voluntarily entered, was an intelli-
gent and competent waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, and
therefore, failue of the court to appoint counsel for him was not a denial
of his constitutional right.'6 In the case of Parker v. Johnson"* it was
noncapital offense); White v. Regan, 324 U. S. 760 (1945) (coerced plea of
guilty) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945) (forced to plead without the advice
of his counsel whose presence he requested); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S.
485 (1945) (petitioner ignorant of his right to counsel) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U. S. 471 (1945) (petitioner requested aid of counsel and request was refused).5 Erwin v. Sanford, 27 F. Supp. 892 (N. D. Ga. 1939).
"8Accord: Adkins v. Sanford, 120 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Franzeen
v. Johnston, 111 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); Cooke v. Swope, 109 F. (2d)
955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) ; Sedorko v. Hudspeth, 109 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 10th,
1940); Harpin v. Johnston, 109 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 9th 1940); cert. denied,
310 U. S. 624 (1940) ; Moore v. Hudspeth, 109 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. X. 10th, 1940) ;
McDonald v. Hudspeth, 108 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940) ; Towne v. Hud-
speth, 108 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939); Cundiff v. Nicholson, 107 F. (2d)
[Voi.25
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held that the accused had waived his right to counsel even though the
court failed to explain this right to him. Furthermore it did not appear
that petitioner was otherwise conscious of his right to counsel. The
court reasoned that since the evidence showed that the accused would
have pleaded guilty even had he been informed of his right to counsel
and therefore the lack of knowledge concerning the existence of his
right was not prejudicial, his free and voluntary plea of guilty consti-
tuted a competent waiver.1 8
It would seem then that in the federal courts a free and voluntary
plea of guilty constitutes an intelligent and competent waiver. The right
to counsel in the federal courts is specifically guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment,10 and is also covered by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.20  As the right to counsel in a state court does not come
under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment, and is covered only by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,21 it would seem to
follow, and the Supreme Court has so held, that the right of the accused
to counsel is afforded a greater protection in the federal courts than in
the state courts.
22
In the instant case, the accused, with his rights fully explained to
him, including his right to counsel, freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty.
Nevertheless, nineteen years after sentence was imposed, the Supreme
Court has granted Carter the right to place before the court, in a proper
action, pertinent facts concerning himself in order that it may then be
determined whether he was capable of intelligently and competently
waiving his right to counsel. The Supreme Court in granting Carter
this right, irrespective of the outcome, has, in this case, afforded greater
protection to an accused in a state court, than is afforded in the federal
162 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); McCoy v. Hudspeth, 106 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 10th,
1939). Cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942);
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 286 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.
458, 468-469 (1938); Roberts v. United States, 158 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 4th,
1946).
" Parker v. Johnson, 29 F. Supp. 829 (N. D. Cal. 1939).
"8Accord: O'Kieth v. Johnson, 129 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942).
"' U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel."
"°U. S. CoNsr. AMEND. V: ".... nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law... !'
" Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942). The due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in
the Sixth Amendment, although a denial by a state of rights or privileges spe-
cifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain
circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to de-
prive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
" Compare Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940) with Glasser v. United
States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942) ; cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942). Mr. Justice
Roberts, speaking for the majority in holding that refusal of the court to appoint
counsel in that situation did not constitute a denial of due process, stated, how-
ever, that if the trial had been in a federal court, the Sixth Amendment would
have made the appointment of counsel mandatory.
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courts where a free and voluntary plea of guilty is held to constitute an
intelligent and competent waiver. It is submitted that should Carter
succeed in getting before the Supreme Court of the United States the
fact that he had no formal education, and was wholly unfamiliar with
court procedure, it will be held that he did not intelligently and com-
petently waive his right to counsel.
23
WILIA H. BURTON, JR.
Constitutional Law-Schools and School Districts-School Bus
Transportation for Parochial School Students
The United States Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education
of Ewing Township,' held it not unconstitutional for a state to provide
transportation to students attending private schools. A New Jersey
statute2 authorized the boards of education of the school districts of
the state t6 make rules and contracts for the transportation of children
to and from school when the children lived remote from any school-
house. The statute specifically included transportation for school chil-
dren to and from school other than a public school, except such school
as is operated for profit in whole or in part. The township of Ewing
had no school past the eighth grade, after which grade children attended
schools in nearby communities. The township provided no transporta-
tion to the other schools but, pursuant to the statute, the school board
adopted a resolution recommending the transportation of pupils to three
public high schools and to Catholic schools by way of public carrier.8
In accordance with this resolution, the school board periodically reim-
bursed parents of children attending the three public high schools and
Catholic schools outside the township for fares expended for transporta-
tion. The plaintiff, as a district taxpayer, challenged the constitution-
ality of the statute and the resolution of the board of education pursuant
to it. The Court of Errors and Appeals, reversing4 the Supreme Court 5
"' The four dissenting justices stated that the record, with these facts included,
shows a denial of due process, although the majority withheld an opinion on this
point until such time as the question was properly before the court.
'- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472 (1947).
'NEW JERSEY LAws 1941, c. 191, p. 581; N. J. REv. STATS. 18:14-8 NJSA.
' (Italics supplied.) An interesting difference in viewpoints concerning this
resolution developed. Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, was of the opinion
that, since the appellant did not allege, and there was nothing in the record to show,
that there were any children in the township who attended or would have attended,
but for want of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools, the statute
and resolution would not be found unconstitutional on a postulate neither charged
nor proved but -which rested on nothing but a possibility. Mr. Justice Rutledge
was of the opinion that it could not be assumed that there were no such children,
but the resolution should be held discriminatory on its face unless it were posi-
tively shown that no other sects sought, or were available to receive, the same
advantages.
'133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. (2d) 333 (1945).
132 N. J. L. 98, 39 A. (2d) 75 (1944).
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